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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
ing implied that some states achieved political stability by other means,
the Court should have inquired into the nature of these alternatives.
By not requiring the State to utilize less drastic means, the Court went
a step further in increasing the latitude of the legislature's authority.
The significance of the Storer decision lies in its implications for
future franchise cases. It suggests that, when election laws that do not
directly and blatantly infringe the rights of voters are challenged, the
Court will lower the justification hurdle that the state must surmount.
As a result, it is likely that the Court will approve electoral restrictions
that accomplish indirectly what it was previously declared could not be
done directly. The Storer decision indicates particularly that when
candidacy restrictions are involved, the Court will apply a more lenient
standard of evaluation. Such an approach by the Court seems unwise,
for little has been gained if a soldier in Texas 6s or an indigent in Vir-
ginia69 is allowed into the voting booth only to discover that those candi-
dates representing his point of view have been excluded from the bal-
lot. James Madison recognized this critical relationship between rights
of candidates and those of voters when he said, "A republic may be
converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy, as well by limiting the num-
ber capable of being elected as the number authorized to elect."' "°
S. ELIZABETH GIBSON
Sovereign Immunity-Scheuer v. Rhodes: Reconciling Section
1983 Damage Actions with Governmental Immunities
In developing satisfactory judicial approaches to the section 1983
remedies of the Civil Rights Act,1 federal courts have encountered con-
its high degree of interparty raiding, and yet it places no requirement of prior disaffilia-
tion on independent candidates. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-122 (Supp. 1973), a
potential independent candidate must file an affidavit stating that he "does not affiliate
with any political party" (emphasis added). There is no further requirement that he
must not have affiliated with a party at any time in the past.
68. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
69. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
70. 5 J. ELLIoT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADoP-
TION OF THE FFDEPAL CONSTITUTION 404 (1845).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22,
§ 1, 17 Stat. 13) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
1974] 439
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
flicting policy considerations. Effective redress for injured parties
against officials "acting under color of" state law has been curtailed by
various governmental immunities designed to protect officials and to
promote efficient, decisive government action.2 Federal courts have
also guarded against overburdening the federal judicial structure and
against unnecessarily preempting traditional state torts.3 These con-
siderations have prompted three significant judicial limitations on sec-
tion 1983 actions:4 (1) a narrow interpretation of the word "person"
in the act;5 (2) a strict construction of the eleventh amendment's
sovereign immunity implications, which has severely limited suits
against the state; 6 and (3) the development of various personal immun-
ities.
Although section 1983 actions against governments have thus
been restricted, the United States Supreme Court in Scheuer v. Rhodes7
unanimously8 reaffirmed the section's vitality in damage actions against
individuals who have allegedly abused governmental executive powers.
In suits brought on behalf of three students killed in 1970 at Kent State
University, the Court held that neither the eleventh amendment nor an
absolute executive immunity sheltered state officials with discretionary9
responsibilities from personal liability for unconstitutional actions.
Although some major issues remain unsettled," Scheuer signals prog-
ress in reconciling section 1983 damage remedies with the policies of
governmental immunity.
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2. See text accompanying note 30 infra.
3. See notes 50-56 and accompanying text infra.
4. McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforce-
ment of Constitutional Protections, 60 VA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1974).
5. See Note, Federal Jurisdiction-Municipal Immunity under the Civil Rights
Act--Closing the Loopholes, 52 N.C.L. Rav. 1289 (1974).
6. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44
U. CoLo. L. REv. 1, 8-13 (1972) traces the interpretative expansion of the eleventh
amendment from its primary purpose, that of protecting states from the debt claims of
citizens of other states, into a broad doctrine of sovereign immunity.
7. 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974).
8. The decision was 8-0, with Mr. Justice Douglas not participating.
9. Courts have traditionally attempted to distinguish between "ministerial" (or
"non-discretionary") duties and "quasi-judicial" (discretionary) duties. An early case
defined a ministerial duty as one in respect "to which nothing is left to discretion. It
is a simple, definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and im-
posed by law." Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 498 (1866). On the
other hand, a discretionary duty is one in which an official has "a power and duty to
make a choice among valid alternatives." Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Of-
ficers: Damage Actions, 77 HIv. L. REv. 209, 218 (1963).
10. See text accompanying note 47 infra.
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The tragedy in question occurred on May 4, 1970, when Ohio
National Guardsmen fired into a group of students at Kent State
University, killing four and injuring nine. Section 1983 actions were
filed on behalf of three deceased students,1 joining as defendants in
their individual capacities Ohio Governor Rhodes, 2 the guard adjutant
and assistant adjutant generals, various other guard personnel and the
Kent State University president. Allegedly, the defendants willfully
caused an unnecessary guard deployment and ordered illegal actions
resulting in the student deaths.' 8
Before answers were filed,' 4 the district court dismissed the
actions'; because they were against the state and therefore barred by
the eleventh amendment. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed,' 6 finding alternatively that an unqualified executive immunity
protected the defendants. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the
dismissals as "inappropriate" and held that the claimants were "entitled
to offer evidence to support [their] claims."'17
In considering the lower courts' sovereign immunity arguments,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed earlier decisions that the eleventh
amendment precluded claims against the state as the named defendant
or the defendant in fact."8 Relying on Ex parte Young,'9 the Court
11. A special counsel to the attorney general of Ohio stated that twenty-two civil
suits had been commenced claiming more than ninety-nine million dollars in damages.
Howarth, Sovereign Immunity-An Argument Pro, 22 CLEV. ST. L. Rlv. 48 (1973).
Many suits encountered difficulties. One was dismissed on the ground that the state
could not be sued in tort. Krause v. Rhodes, 28 Ohio App. 2d 1, 274 N.E.2d 321
(1971), rev'd, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
1052 (1973). In another, the Court held that a suit for injunctive relief against prema-
ture deployment of the guard by government officials and for a declaration that a state
statute was unconstitutional was not justiciable under the circumstances. Gilligan v.
Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
12. Governor Rhodes was sued for initially calling out the guard and for allegedly
inciting unconstitutional activity later. Brief for Petitioners at 11-12, 59-60, Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974).
13. 94 S. Ct. at 1686.
14. Two proclamations by the governor were attached to the motion to dismiss,
one ordering the guard to protect against truck strike violence and the other recounting
conditions on the Kent State campus. Id.
15. Krause v. Rhodes, Civil No. C 70-544 (N.D. Ohio, June 2, 1971); Miller v.
Rhodes, Civil No. C 70-816 (N.D. Ohio, June 2, 1971); Scheuer v. Rhodes, Civil No.
C 70-859 (N.D. Ohio, June 2, 1971).
16. Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972) (2-1 decision).
17. 94 S. Ct. at 1686.
18. Id. at 1687, citing Edelman v. Jordan, 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974).
19. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). This case, which permitted suit for injunctive relief
against the attorney general of Minnesota to prohibit enforcement of an allegedly un-
constitutional statute, attempted to reconcile the eleventh amendment prohibition of
suits against the state with the fourteenth amendment prohibition of constitutional in-
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nevertheless concluded that "the Eleventh Amendment provides no
shield for a state official" confronted by a section 1983 claim. The
Court reasoned that
when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of
the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the superior
authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his
official or representative character and is subjected in his person
to the consequences of his individual conduct. ' 20
Although both Young and Scheuer concerned state officers with con-
siderable discretionary powers, the two cases arguably can be distin-
guished because Young was a federal action seeking an injunction
rather than monetary damages. Nevertheless, Scheuer concluded that,
as long as recovery is not sought from public funds, executive officials
whose discretionary conduct2' violates section 1983 rights can be sued
for damages in their individual capacities.22
In similarly rejecting the court of appeal's theory of executive im-
munity,2 3 the Supreme Court indicated that immunities were judicial
value judgments. Executive immunity, for example, represented "'an
impression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of
government.' ",24 Unlike absolute legislative 2 and judicial20 immuni-
ties, however, unqualified executive immunities are not firmly en-
fringements occurring "under color of" state law. This case was the precedent for ac-
tions against school boards in the important desegregation cases of the 1950's.
20. 94 S. Ct. at 1687, quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
21. The three cases cited to support the Court's conclusion involved public officials
with relatively little discretionary power. In Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915),
an election official violated section 1983 by enforcing a "grandfather clause" in Mary-
land that effectively denied a black the right to vote. Damage actions in voting cases
have been previously justified by the special nature of the constitutional deprivation.
See McCormack, supra note 4, at 60-64. The other two cases, Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961), and Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), concerned
alleged brutality by law enforcement officials.
22. Although courts might recognize an absolute sovereign immunity for states
under the eleventh amendment depriving federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction,
there is no jurisdictional bar to section 1983 actions against state executive officials in
their individual capacities. The qualified immunity enjoyed by executive officials is an
affirmative defense or privilege, more accurately relating to the claim's merits than to
a court's jurisdiction. See Engdahl, supra note 6, at 41.
23. "It can hardly be argued at this late date that under no circumstances can the
officers of state government be subject to liability under [section 1983]." Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1690 (1974).
24. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1959), quoted in Scheuer v. Rhodes,
94 S. Ct. 1683, 1689 (1974). Barr involved a libel action rather than a section 1983
infringement.
25. 94 S. Ct. at 1690, citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951).
26. 94 S. Ct. at 1690, citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
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trenched in law and judicial history. 7  Since Congress did not intend
for section 1983 to abolish all common law immunities2s or to be com-
pletely circumscribed by absolute immunities,29 the Court initiated a
search for a middle ground. Citing previous immunity justifications
such as possible injustice to officials who are required to make
discretionary decisions and harm to efficient, effective government, °
the Court noted that the concept of immunity presupposes that "it is
better [for an official] to risk some error and possible injury from such
error than not to decide or act at all." 1
Despite such considerations, the Court concluded that judicial
review of discretionary executive conduct allegedly violating constitu-
tional rights was imperative. Otherwise, for example, a governor's
determination of the "fact" of an insurrection to justify his actions would
make "the fiat of a state governor, and not the Constitution of the
United States"32 the supreme law of the land. To prevent section 1983
from being "drained of meaning,"33 the Court iroposed a qualified im-
munity for executive-branch personnel. The immunity would be
dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the
office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared ...
It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the
time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good faith
27. 94 S. Ct. at 1691. The Court noted that unlike executive actions, judicial er-
rors may be reviewed and corrected on appeal. Id. at 1690. Judge Celebrezze examined
the status of executive immunities in greater detail in Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430,
454 (6th Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
28. 94 S. Ct. at 1690.
29. Id. at 1692.
30. Id. at 1688.
31. Id. at 1689. In Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), Judge
Learned Hand held that the United States Attorney General and other federal officials
enjoyed absolute immunities when sued by the plaintiff allegedly for falsely arresting
him as an enemy alien. Hand reasoned that it was "better to leave unredressed the
wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the
constant dread of retaliation." Id. Although Scheuer appears to have approved Hand's
logic, the Gregoire result has probably been overruled, at least concerning section 1983
actions, by Scheuer and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir.
1972), on remand from 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Because Bivens held that federal officials
were subject to suit under section 1983, one commentator suggested, even before Scheuer,
that Bivens might have overruled Gregoire. Engdahl, supra note 6, at 54. This implies
that Hand's logic in Gregoire, while still compelling, may no longer represent overriding
considerations.
32. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397-98 (1932), quoted in Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (1974). In Sterling the Governor of Texas justified
seizure of certain oil wells because of an insurrection. Rejecting the argument that the
Governor's determination was unreviewable, the Court examined the facts involved, de-
termined that the Governor's actions were indefensible, and granted the plaintiff's re-
quest for a restraining order.3.94 S. Ct.at 1692,
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belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive of-
ficers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.3"
The lower courts were admonished not to presume either an official's
good faith or the existence of reasonable justification for the actions
taken.35 Although distinguishing between duties involving little discre-
tion and those in which the range of possible decisions is "virtually in-
finite,"36 the Court rejected any categorical distinction between minis-
terial and discretionary functions as a basis for the immunity.87 Con-
centrating instead on the nature of the particular duties allegedly
abused, the Court incorporated the subjective "good faith" and objec-
tive "reasonableness" standards of Pierson v. Ray8" into a qualified im-
munity for discretionary actions. Thus, the extent of the immunity
would vary with the scope of discretion dictated by the circumstances
of the case. 39
The Court's proposed standards reflect the complicated considera-
tions inherent in damage actions involving official abuse of discretion-
ary powers. As an official's range of viable options increases, it
becomes more difficult to formulate clear-cut grounds for liability. 40 In
determining whether an official acted within the scope of his permis-
sible discretion, lower courts have agreed with the Supreme Court that
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1693.
36. Id. at 1691.
37. Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REv. 263, 297-
301 (1937) criticizes such distinctions as tests in determining administrative liability.
38. 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
39. Judge Celebrezze's two-tier analytical framework would be adaptable to the
Court's formation-if the actions were "within the range of discretionary measures
which were justified by the exigencies of the situation," defenses of good faith or honest
belief became relevant; if outside that range, the defenses were not allowed. Krause
v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 463 (6th Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion). The initial de-
termination is whether the action was within the permissible scope of discretion. In
one case, for example, involving libel rather than a section 1983 violation, immunity
was granted for statements made during the school board's investigation of a superinten-
dent, but comments to newspaper reporters were ultra vires and therefore not protected.
iUpman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1961).
40. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently had to consider grounds for liabil-
ity for executive officials with differing levels of responsibility in Roberts v. Williams,
456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971). The court found a super-
intendent of a prison farm personally liable when a trusty guard that he appointed shot
an inmate. The ground for liability was the superintendent's failure adequately to train
and supervise the guard, who was twenty-three years old, had only a fourth-grade educa-
tion, and had been previously convicted of assault with intent to kill. Id. at 821-22.
Despite their awareness of the superintendent's policies, however, members of the farm's
board of supervisors were deemed not liable for a "good faith, reasonable choice among
valid policy alternatives, even if an unwise one. . . ." Id. at 831.
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certain governmental responsibilities entail broad discretion. 41  Gover-
nor Rhodes' initial deployment of the guard may well have been a
reasonable choice among valid alternatives unless, however, he were
aware of the guard's purported unusual propensity for violence. 42 He
might also be liable if he later incited the use of unnecessary force at
Kent State.43 It would be more difficult to find the Kent State presi-
dent's conduct actionable merely because of his passive acquiescence
in the governor's apparent authority.44
Despite greater fairness to section 1983 claimants and increased
official accountability for unconstitutional acts, the conflict between
these important considerations and the policy justifications for immunity
remains unresolved. Fear of personal liability still results in indecision,
and defending claims is highly burdensome.4 5, On the other hand,
broad immunities can bar plaintiffs from any effective avenue of
redress.46
Scheuer's attempt to reconcile these competing policy considera-
tions also raises some uncertainties47 and problems. First, analysis of
the immunity solely in terms of the reasonableness of the defendant's
actions arguably ignores the seriousness of the alleged offense. 48 This
41. Id. at 831.
42. The Ohio National Guard in 1970, according to one charge made after the
Kent State tragedy, was particularly prone to violence because of the nature of their
training and use of loaded weapons. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 4 (1973).
Roberts, for example, suggested that the board of supervisors members might have been
personally liable on charges of cruel and unusual punishment under section 1983 if they
had been aware of certain disciplinary practices at the camp. Roberts v. Williams, 456
F.2d 819, 832 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971). Although Governor
Rhodes' knowledge of the guard's propensity for violence would not be actionable, that
knowledge might suggest the unreasonableness of dispatching the guard to Kent State.
43. See note 12 supra.
44. Personal liability for educators is an increasing concern. One commentator
believes that members of a board of regents in general are not "proper parties" to a dam-
age action. McCormack, supra note 4, at 16.
45. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
46. A governor, for example, may be immune for reasonably choosing between
valid policy alternatives and soldiers immune in carrying out their duties in a reasonable
manner. Thus no recovery would be possible even if a plaintiff unquestionably was de-
prived of constitutional rights by the combination of actions.
47. One such uncertainty concerns the applicability of the Scheuer qualified im-
munity standards to equitable remedies. Unlike damage actions, equity suits under sec-
tion 1983 generally involve the performance or nonperformance of official duties with-
out the attendant threat of extensive personal liability to officials. Considerations of
indecisive action or injustice to officials that justify executive immunities in damage ac-
tions are much less relevant in equity suits. Justification for a qualified immunity might
exist, however, because of the potentially disruptive effect of equity suits on government
and the general reluctance of courts to review fully the constitutionality of every deci-
sion of executive branch officials.
48. One commentator would assess executive immunity claims in terms of the
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particular shortcoming, however, may be more apparent than real; the
Court's assessment of the reasonableness of an official's conduct would
certainly take into account the likelihood that such conduct would in-
duce unnecessary violence.49
In addition, Scheuer may encourage suits by claimants with minor,
or even feckless, grievances. 50 Therefore, a narrower definition of the
claims permitted under section 1983 possibly should accompany the
lowering of the immunity barrier. 1 Recognizing the fundamental
change in federal-state relations resulting from section 1983,2 Con-
gress carefully limited recoveries to "rights, privileges, and immunities"
secured by the Constitution. s Since the act was designed to supple-
ment rather than to supplant traditional state remedies, the rapid ex-
pansion of the scope of actions permitted under the section has elicited
criticism.5  Greater care in restricting these actions would protect both
the federal courts and government officials from relatively minor claims
that should not be considered "constitutional torts." 56
character and severity of the plaintiffs injury, the existence of alternative remedies, the
court's capacity to evaluate the propriety of the official's acts and the effect of liability
on effective administration. Jaffe, supra note 9, at 219.
49. One aspect of determining reasonableness should be the foreseeability of types
of injuries that a certain action might produce, with actions risking unreasonable in-
juries being outside the scope of permissible discretion. Resort to military action, for
example, "has traditionally been viewed with suspicion and skepticism." Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1691 (1974).
50. In Roberts v. Barbosa, 227 F. Supp. 20 (S.D. Cal. 1964), for example, the
plaintiff named forty-four different defendants representing almost every level of gov-
ernment service. The complaint was dismissed on traditional immunity grounds.
51. One list of wrongs actionable under section 1983 included violations of speech,
assembly, religion, privacy; racial discrimination in labor, education, housing, public ac-
commodations, and voting; economic discrimination, the right to bear arms, freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures, the right to vote and to participate in political
processes; due process in criminal investigating, indictment, trials and appeal; and equal-
ity in legislative and congressional apportionment. Comment, Civil Actions for Dam-
ages under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TExAs L. Rav. 1015, 1021 (1967).
52. The "legislative history makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it
was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to the pro-
tection of federally created rights." Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972), hold-
ing that section 1983 provided an authorized exception to the anti-injunction statute.
53. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
54. See McCormack, supra note 4, at 7.
55. Although immunities are one means of limiting redress, the policy considera-
tions supporting immunities differ from those justifying restrictions on section 1983 ac-
tions. The goals of the latter are avoidance of unnecessary preemption of traditional
state torts and the protection of the federal courts from a flood of relatively minor
claims. Qualified immunities, on the other hand, exempt tortfeasors from personal lia-
bility whenever certain conditions are met, regardless of the seriousness of the violation
and the availability of redress from other sources.
56. Compare Shapo, Constitutional Tort Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Be-
yond, 60 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 277, 324, 327 (1965), with McCormack, supra note 4, at 7-
10, Shapo, suggesting the dangers of preempting state laws, wo ld liit acteonb19 iq-
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Another means of guarding against undue harassment of officials
would be to redefine the traditional role of qualified immunities. The
Supreme Court's emphasis on reasonableness 57 to justify executive con-
duct is analagous to the "reasonable man" standard in torts. Thus, a
"reasonable official" standard might be adopted, with the scope of per-
missible discretion inherent in the office becoming an important con-
sideration in determining the reasonableness of the conduct. In addi-
tion, rather than a defendant asserting and proving an affirmative de-
fense, the section 1983 plaintiff might be required to overcome a
presumption of reasonableness of the official's conduct.58
Even though unnecessary harassment of executive officials can be
minimized, 59 the detente between executive immunities and section
1983 actions remains fragile. As long as governments summarily deny
responsibility for wrongful actions of their employees, 0 the Scheuer
approach may nevertheless be the best available. Since reliance on the
individual offender for redress in these situations is inadequate, govern-
ment responsibility is imperative as the only feasible means of recon-
ciling the conflicting policy considerations between executive immuni-
ties and section 1983 actions. 61 If governments would acknowledge
the common-law assurance of state indemnity for damages incurred by
a public official's exercise of good faith judgment,"2 restraints on
decisive action would clearly be reduced. A government's shielding
juries to "outrageous" situations. Stressing that the federal remedy is supplementary to
state remedies, McCormack criticizes Shapo's definition of constitutional torts as being
too dependent on emotion and, instead, would emphasize the form of the remedy and
a plaintiffs reasonable belief that the officer was pursuing a governmental objective.
57. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (1974).
58. Caution should be taken, however, not to make the plaintiff's burden too
onerous. Summary judgment can be another valid means of protecting defendants from
frivolous claims, but the Court appears concerned that section 1983 claimants not be
dismissed prematurely. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
59. Other means of protecting government officials are also available. Govern-
ments could agree to reimburse officials for defense expenses if the officials were ulti-
mately exonerated or if they could demonstrate good faith. The greater use of adminis-
trative boards and procedures, though possibly of little help in emergency situations,
would protect plaintiffs' rights and provide a convenient forum for presentation of the
reasons for an official's actions. See Jennings, supra note 37, at 306-14, for a thorough
analysis of administrative processes that could be established.
60. McCormack, supra note 4, at 29, concluded that "vicarious liability would be
an effective deterrent, and therefore it is unfortunate that the Court dismissed it out of
hand" in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
61. There is little reason now for states not to acknowledge financial responsibility
for their employees' actions. "Given the availability of insurance and the ability of
states to raise revenues, there is no reason to protect the state from the legitimate claims
of its constituents." Verkuil, Immunity or Responsibility for Unconstitutional Conduct:
The Aftermath of Jackson State and Kent State, 50 N.C.L. Rnv. 548, 558 1972),
62, Jaffe, supra note 9, at g16,
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-fbbth the individual official and itself from suit may also deny a due
process right to redress under section 1983.8 As a corollary, not only
-should at least one defendant be amenable to suit but, in the interests
of justice, he should also be financially responsible.
Although Chief Justice Burger has recommended a viable format
for congressional action in this area, 64 legislatures have been unwilling
to take the needed steps. 5 Although the Court might understandably
prefer that legislative action break the sovereign immunity barrier, 0
Congress arguably has already expressed its intent in enacting section
1983. Since judicial value judgments created the initial expansion of
state immunities, the Court should possibly re-examine those judgments
and affix "respondeat superior" responsibility to governments for un-constitutional employee actions.67  Scheuer, however, may have accom-
plished this more subtly. With officials subject to personal liability,
governments may find that to attract and keep qualified executive per-
sonnel, they will have to protect those officials from expensive damage
actions either through assurances of indemnity or by consenting to
suit.6
8
63. Verkuil, supra note 61, at 597.
64. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 421-23 (1971) (dissent-
ing opinion). In launching an attack on the exclusionary rule, the Chief Justice sug-
gested the creation of an effective means of redress for citizens whose rights are violated
by unlawful fourth amendment conduct by government officials. These suggestions for
a remedy against the government itself appear adaptable to section 1983 violations:
(a) a waiver of sovereign immunity as to illegal acts of law enforcement
officials committed in the performance of assigned duties;(b) the creation of a cause of action for damages sustained by any per-
son aggrieved by conduct of governmental agents in violation of the Fourth
Amendment or statutes regulating official conduct;(c) the creation of a tribunal, quasi-judicial in nature or perhaps pat-
"terned after the United States Court of Claims, to adjudicate all claims under
the statute ...
Id. at 422-23.
65. Governments have generally refused to acknowledge liability for employee ac-
tions. See Engdahl, supra note 6, at 18, 55-56. Engdahl concluded that even the right
to indemnity would provide little solace when the state refused to be sued for indemnity.
He suggested that the replacement of older nineteenth century immunity standards,
which were quite harsh on executive officials, would be unqualifiedly beneficial if effec-
tive alternative means for redress were available for aggrieved plaintiffs.
66. Previous eleventh amendment interpretations, the long existence of the im-
munities, and the considerable financial burden that might be felt by governments would
certainly help explain the Court's reluctance.
67. The Court has not refrained from imposing financial burdens on governments
when constitutional rights were at stake. In Griffin v. Board of Educ., 377 U.S. 218(1964), for example, the Court demanded that public schools be kept open even if local
taxes had to be raised.
68. State and federal governments will be affected because the Scheuer standards
have already been held applicable to federal executive officials. States Marine Lines,
Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (1974).
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The Supreme Court has taken important steps toward assuring that
section 1983 claims against executive officials will have a full hearing
in federal courts. Initiating a reevaluation of governmental immunity
justifications, the Court has also proposed a workable qualified immun-
ity standard for alleged abuses of discretionary power. The Court's
concern for the plight of citizens deprived of constitutional rights under
color of state law hopefully will reveal the inadequacy of relying solely
on individual officials for compensation. The Court has recognized the
necessity for individual accountability in section 1983 actions. The
next step, whether taken by the legislature or the judiciary, is to assure
that the accountability is extended to the government. Employer
responsibility for the actions of its employees, especially when the em-
ployer has clothed those actions in the legitimacy of state law, cannot
justifiably end where government employment begins.
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